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ABSTRACT
I construct direct measures of labor-leisure distortions for the American economy during the
period 1889-1996, using a new method for empirically evaluating competitive equilibrium models and
extending that method to some noncompetitive situations.  I then compare measured labor-leisure
distortions to proxies for potential restraints of trade: distortionary taxes and subsidies, labor market
regulation, monopoly unionism, and search frictions.
Distortions have grown steadily over the century, with the exception of the Great Depression
(when distortions were above trend), WWII (below trend), and the 1980's (below trend).  Marginal tax
rates are well correlated with labor-leisure distortions at low frequencies, but cannot explain Depression,
wartime, or 1980's distortions.  Monopoly unionism might explain a small part of the Depression
distortions, and the decline of unions might explain some of the reduced distortions in the 1980's.  In
general, I find the decade-to-decade aggregate fluctuations in consumption, wages, and work to be hard
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Explaining aggregate measures of behavior, especially measures of labor market activity,
has for decades been one of the prime interests of macroeconomists, and others.  Almost as old
is the question of how much aggregate behavior might be explained by private sector impulses
(in modern parlance: tastes, technology, market structure, and demographic shocks) rather than
public sector impulses such as government regulations, taxes, and subsidies.  Somewhat more
recent are attempts to model private sector behavior as a dynamic competitive equilibrium, and
Kydland and Prescott (1982) is one rather successful one.
While various explanations in the literature differ in a number of dimensions, a great
many of them have two common conceptual ingredients: the marginal value of time (MRS) and
the marginal product of labor (MPL).  Furthermore, it is supposed that these two values are
stable functions of relatively few variables, and are somehow equilibrated by the economic
system.  The approach in this paper is to separately measure MRS and MPL for the last century,
and ￿test￿ whether they are related.  In doing so, I resurrect some old puzzles (eg., ￿Why was
employment low during the Depression?￿), but also reveal a new puzzle.  Most importantly, I
usefully quantify both the old and new puzzles, and offer clear and quantitative suggestions how
a more successful theory of the labor market might utilize these old concepts, MRS and MPL.
Some related calculations for the postwar period can be found in Parkin (1988) and Hall
(1997), two macroeconomic studies of time-varying preferences.  They compare the postwar time
series behavior of the consumption-leisure ratio, which they interpret as one of two determinants
of a representative consumer￿s marginal rate of consumption-leisure substitution, to the time
series behavior of the average product of labor, which they interpret as the one determinant of
the marginal product of labor.  Their models do not allow for market distortions so, when these
two series diverge, they say that there is evidence of a preference shift.  Elsewhere (Mulligan
2000) I suggest that the Hall-Parkin calculations might instead be interpreted as indicators of
labor market distortions, so the purpose of this paper is to explore whether the distortionaryCentury of Distortions - 2
MRSt ' (1 & Jt)MPLt (1) (1) (1) (1)
interpretation might be more appropriate for the U.S. 20
th century time series.
Both trends and medium-term fluctuations are of interest here, and there are some
variables that help explain both trends and fluctuations.  But there are some forces, such as
demographics, that mainly affect trends, and others, such as wars, that mainly affect fluctuations.
While the methods used here can be used to define and study both trends and fluctuations, an
empirical study of the forces relevant to both is too much for one paper, so I focus on the
medium-term fluctuations.  My analysis suggests that the largest of these fluctuations are the
1930’s, the 1940’s, and the 1980’s.  A byproduct of the analysis is time series of the quantity of
labor market regulation, and the aggregate effects of monopoly unionism.  A number of studies
have suggested that regulation and unionism have noticeable aggregate effects, so these new time
series are likely to be useful regardless of the theoretical approach to modeling the labor market.
II.  The ￿Labor Equilibrium￿ Equation to be Examined II.  The ￿Labor Equilibrium￿ Equation to be Examined II.  The ￿Labor Equilibrium￿ Equation to be Examined II.  The ￿Labor Equilibrium￿ Equation to be Examined
This paper is essentially a study of one important ￿labor equilibrium￿ equation from
economic theory, the one that equates the marginal value of time (MRS) to the ￿after-tax￿
marginal product of labor (MPL):
where t indexes calendar time, and J is the marginal ￿tax￿ rate.  Equation (1) is implied by a huge
class of models of the labor market including, but not limited to, various static general
equilibrium models, various dynamic general equilibrium models such as the representative
agent ￿real business cycle￿ models of King, Plosser, and Rebelo (1988) and Kydland and Prescott
(1983), (partly) noncompetitive equilibrium models such as Wu and Zhang (2000), models with
financial frictions, and models with discrete choice and/or heterogeneous agents such as
Houthakker (1955) and Mulligan (2001a).  Furthermore, I argue below that Equation (1) is readily
extended to include models with employment search frictions.
III.  Construction of the Direct Distortion Measures III.  Construction of the Direct Distortion Measures III.  Construction of the Direct Distortion Measures III.  Construction of the Direct Distortion MeasuresCentury of Distortions - 3
1Parkin (1988) and Hall (1997) is two exceptions from the macroeconomic literature,
suggesting that the important determinants of MRS are unobserved preference parameters. 
Other exceptions from the macroeconomic literature are some of the studies of household
production (eg., Benhabib et al (1991) or Ingram et al (1997)), which suggest that the mix of
nonmarket time between leisure and household changes significantly from year to year.
2Some models of distortions (counterfactually?) imply that measured wage rates and
labor productivity should diverge ￿ see Appendix III.
MPLt / "Yt/Lt or wt/Lt (2) (2) (2) (2)
III.A.  Functional Forms From the Literature
The labor equilibrium equation (1) would be most powerful if MRSt, MPLt, and/or Jt
could be measured directly, independently, and without error.  This is not the case, but many
(including, but not limited to, the papers cited above) have supposed that MRSt and MPLt are
stable and fairly simple functions of output, average consumption, average hourly earnings, and
work hours.
1  In particular, a great many studies have assumed that the marginal product of labor
is equal to employee compensation (plus a fraction of self-employment income) per manhour,
or that MPL proportional to the average product of labor, as it would be if output Yt were Cobb-
Douglas in labor input Lt:
where  " is the coefficient of proportionality, aka ￿labor￿s share,￿ and w is employee
compensation plus a fraction of self-employment income.  Since the ratio of employee
compensation to GDP are pretty constant over time, these two approximations are practically
the same,
2 except during WWII when measured GDP increased 7 percentage points less than
employee compensation.  I use (employee compensation + 0.615*selfemployment income) per
manhour as my proxy for marginal product, except prior to 1929 (which I do not have an
employee compensation series) when I use 0.615*the average product of labor.
In some models of imperfect goods market competition, the marginal product of labor
exceeds the real wage, the marginal revenue product of labor, and (labor￿s share*average product
of labor).  To the extent this is true, my analysis is of the wedge between marginal revenue
product and MRS, without regards for the wedge between marginal product and real marginalCentury of Distortions - 4
3Hansen￿s quasilinear utility function has the additional implication that labor is zero
(or at its maximum feasible value) whenever 2c is strictly greater (less) than (1-J)MPL. 
Hansen (1985,) derives 2c = (1-J)MPL as a condition of equilibrium (so that aggregate labor is




(3) (3) (3) (3)




(5) (5) (5) (5)
revenue product.  As suggested by Hall (1986), this neglected wedge is related to labor￿s share
and, since labor￿s share of GDP is pretty constant over time, presumably does not vary nearly
as much as the first wedge.  With this in mind, I hereafter refer to the "Y/L as the average
product of labor.
More than one function, but still relatively few, have been used in the macroeconomics
literature to compute the marginal value of time.  Two of those are:
The first value of time function (3) derives from time separable log utility, as used by King,
Plosser, and Rebelo (1988) and others.  The second, equation (4), derives from the time separable
and linear-in-labor utility function used by Hansen (1985) and others.
3
Most of the literature cited has not been concerned with explaining behavior prior to 1929,
and in doing so it may be desirable to consider a third value of time function (5) ￿ one derived
from a Stone-Geary modification of the log:Century of Distortions - 5
where ( is a subsistence level of consumption and (5) presumes that ct exceeds that level.
The methods use here make it quite easy to search for the best MRS function (in
econometrics parlance, ￿estimate￿ the MRS function).  Appendix IV looks at four other MRS
functions, showing why at least two of (3), (4), (5) are prevalent in the literature for a good
reason ￿ they fit a century of aggregate data (relatively) well.
The methods used here also apply even when the labor equilibrium equation (1) does not
hold for all, or even many, individuals.  For example, consider an economy where individual
labor supply must be either zero or one, and individuals differ in terms of their willingness to
supply labor.  In this case, (1) should be interpreted as equating the value of time for the marginal
worker (which is different than the value of time for other workers) to his after-tax marginal
product of labor.  Of course, the identity of this marginal worker is likely to change over time,
but all that is needed to apply the methods of this paper is for the marginal workers￿ value of
time and marginal product be stable (and known) functions of a few measurable aggregate
variables, as they are in Mulligan￿s (2001a) model.  When using functional forms like (3) or (5),
this simply means that an economy with more average consumption, or more aggregate labor,
has a higher value of time for its marginal worker.
In other words, among the variety of interpretations and applications of equation (1), the
application here is to data aggregated over time and across persons.  Equation (1) might thereby
be interpreted as describing the relationship between the ￿aggregate￿ supply and demand for
labor ￿ rather than any individual￿s willingness to supply or pay for labor services.  In particular,
￿labor input￿ L is an aggregate of men and women, educated and uneducated, ￿hours￿ and
￿participation.￿  At this level, the theory has little to say about the allocation of aggregate hours
among various groups or various margins.  I return in Section 7 to this point, and suggest that
a less aggregate analysis would not help explain some of the major failures of equation (1) as
applied to a century of aggregate data.
III.B.  Data Sources
(2) and either (3), (4), or (5) can be used to compute time series for the marginal value of
time and marginal product of labor.  Or they can be used together to compute the marginal tax
rate J ^ implied by the functional forms and the labor equilibrium equation, as in equations (4)NCentury of Distortions - 6
4(4)N and (5)N are the appropriate definitions when MPL is measured as a proportion of
the average product of labor.  w replaces "Y in the formulas when MPL is measured as
compensation per manhour.
5When necessary, these are converted to 1996 dollars by chaining together various
GDP deflator series.  As mentioned in the text, the deflator is irrelevant for computing
implied tax rates as long as the relevant deflator is the same for personal consumption
expenditures and GDP.
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(5) (5) (5) (5)N N N N
and (5)N:
4
With a direct measure of the marginal tax rate, we can then test the labor equilibrium equation
(1) by comparing measured marginal tax rates {Jt} with those {J ^t} implied by the quantity series
{Lt,ct/Yt} and the functional forms (2) - (5).
Hence, to compute times series for MRS and MPL we need four (per capita) time series:
real consumption, real output or labor compensation, labor input, and leisure time (which is
essentially three series if we restrict labor and leisure time to sum to one).  We need one less
series to calculate implied tax rates: labor input, leisure time, and the consumption-output ratio.
I measure the four series for the period 1889-1996.  ￿Consumption￿ c is measured as NIPA
personal consumption expenditures (1889-1928 from Kendrick (1961, Table A-IIb) and 1929-96
from BEA NIPA Table 1.01), and therefore includes import, sales, and excise taxes paid by
consumers with their purchases (BEA 1990, p. 32).
5  Output Y is measured as GDP (same sources
as  c) and w as labor compensation (which is the sum of employee compensation and
0.615*proprietor￿s adjusted income, both from NIPA Table 1.14).  Labor input is the product of
total employment and hours per employee.  The former is from Kendrik (1961, Table A-VI)
through 1928, from Census Bureau (1975, series D-5 and D-15) 1929-58, and from the BLS seriesCentury of Distortions - 7
1959-96.  Kendrick also estimates hours per employee, and reports its product with civilian
employment (1961, Table A-X) through 1953.  For the years 1954-88, I measure annual hours per
employee as average weekly hours calculated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (1988) from the
Current Population Survey (plus 0.7, and times 52, to match Kendrick￿s annual hours series in
1953).
The series {Lt,ct/Yt} are displayed in Figure 1 for the reader￿s reference.  It is important
to notice that there are four major changes in aggregate labor (including military labor) hours
during the period:
(i) labor hours have fallen substantially: compare 1889-1929 with 1950-96,
(ii) labor hours were low during the Great Depression,
(iii) labor hours were high during WWII, and
(iv) labor hours rose in the 1980’s
With the exception of (i), these changes are mainly due to changes in the fraction of people aged
15+ who are employed sometime during the year, rather than changes in hours per employee.
We see similar, although less dramatic, changes in the consumption-output ratio:
(i) c/Y is somewhat lower in the latter half of the century,
(ii) c/Y is relatively high during the Great Depression,
(iii) c/Y is low during WWII, and
(iv) c/Y rose in the 1980’s
These changes drive the main calculations regarding the labor equilibrium equation, so I discuss
them in some detail below as I present the calculations.Century of Distortions - 8
6Results are quite insensitive to small changes in the definition of ￿war years￿ because
these adjustments are trivial when the military is small, or there is a volunteer force.
7ie, the difference between labor compensation and military wages and salaries.
Figure 1 Figure 1 Figure 1 Figure 1  Primary Time Series Used to Simulate Tax Wedges
Two adjustments are made during wartime (1939-48)
6.  First, MPL is measured as civilian
labor compensation
7 per civilian manhour, rather than labor compensation per (civilian +
military) manhour.  During WWII, military employment grew by a factor of 20 while military
wages rates fell substantially, both in absolute terms and relative to civilian wages, whichCentury of Distortions - 9
8Civilian consumption is measured as the difference between aggregate personal
consumption expenditures and one half of military wages (assuming that half of military
wages are saved, paid in taxes, or paid to civilian family members).
probably can not be attributed either to a reduced marginal product or to a reduced value of time
for military personnel (that is why so many of them had to be drafted!).  Hence, the wartime
marginal product of labor is calculated from civilian data only.
I also adjust wartime consumption by excluding military personnel.  In other words,
rather than computing c as the ratio of aggregate personal consumption expenditures to the
population aged 15+ (as I do for peacetime years), I compute wartime c as the ratio of civilian
personal consumption expenditures to the civilian population aged 15+.
8  This adjustment slightly
increases measured wartime consumption.  If the required data were available, both of these
adjustments could be for the entire century, but the adjustments would be trivial in any year
where military personnel are few in number or are paid like civilians.
IV.  Aggregate Distortions Displayed and Interpreted IV.  Aggregate Distortions Displayed and Interpreted IV.  Aggregate Distortions Displayed and Interpreted IV.  Aggregate Distortions Displayed and Interpreted
IV.A.  Functional Forms as Applied to the 20
th Century Data
In order to compute the MRS and MRT using the formulas (2) - (5), numerical values
must be assigned to the parameters ", 2, and (.  The literature often sets " at 2/3 and, in the log
utility case, 2 at 0.7 or 0.75 in order to match the levels of MRS and MPL with each other and
with wage data for the postwar period.  I do basically the same (" = 0.615; 2 = 0.7 for log utility;
2 = 0.0005 for quasilinear utility; and 2 = 0.725, ( = 1000 1996 dollars for Stone-Geary utility) to
match MRS and (1-J)MPL with each other and with wage and tax data (see Section V) for the
period 1950-79, but notice from (4)N and (5)N that the calculated levels of MRS and MPL are
irrelevant for testing the labor equilibrium equation (1), because only their ratio MRS/MPL, and
its changes over time, affect the implied marginal tax rate and its changes over time. 
Although the parameter 2 affects neither the direction nor the magnitude of changes in
implied marginal tax rates, the functional forms (3) - (5) do affect the magnitude of those
changes and, to some degree, their direction.  There are three relative dimensions on which to
classify MRS functions: intertemporal separability, and the elasticities of MRS with respect to
contemporaneous consumption and leisure.  Barro and King (1984) have shown how theCentury of Distortions - 10
9The methods used in this paper can be readily applied to any MRS function,
including those not separable over time.  Because my focus is on episodes with large and rapid
changes in consumption and/or leisure, I have not made such calculations, and suggest that
the main results are robust to more complicated MRS functions as long as there is a relatively
strong weight on contemporaneous consumption and leisure.
10The MRS series based on quasilinear utility is omitted in order to avoid cluttering
Figure 2, but is displayed in Figure 3 which is the focus of my analysis.
11Noted that various prewar data series are interpolated between Census years.  In
particular, sector output fluctuations are often used to interpolate sector employment
fluctuations between Census years (eg., Lebergott 1964, p. 440).  This tends to lead to too
little variation in the output employment ratio for the interpolated years, and hence too little
variation in my quantity-based MPL series.
intertemporal separability of preferences implies that consumption and leisure move in different
directions only when the after-tax wage changes.  For example, this implies that, in the absence
of any wage change, any intertemporally separable utility function for which consumption and
leisure are normal goods will produce simulated tax rates that fall in the 1980’s ￿ merely because
consumption and leisure move in opposite directions.
9
Functional forms such (3), (4), (5), and the MRS functions considered in Appendix IV
are intertemporally separable, and in addition assume particular elasticities with respect
consumption and leisure.  Choice among these functional forms obviously affects the magnitude
of implied rate changes, but it can also affect the direction of changes if consumption and leisure
are moving together or if wages are changing while consumption and leisure move apart.
IV.B.  Relative trends and fluctuations of MRS and MPL
Figure 2 displays the MPL series and two MRS series calculated using the formulas (2) -
(5).
10  The MPL grows steadily,
11 although perhaps at a higher rate since 1929.  All three of the
MRS series are much less smooth than MPL.  This includes noticeable year-to-year variation as
well as three episodes of substantial medium term fluctuations:
(i) Both MRS series fall substantially during the Great Depression
(ii) Both MRS series rise substantially during WWII
(iii) Both MRS series rise substantially during the 1980’sCentury of Distortions - 11
Figure 2 Figure 2 Figure 2 Figure 2   MPL and MRS
Although not shown in Figure 2, (i) and (iii) can also be concluded from the Hansen MRS
function.  As I discuss below, the Hansen MRS series does not deviate from trend during WWII.
These conclusions are not sensitive to the exclusion of durables expenditures from the
consumption series, because durables are a small and stable fraction of total consumption
expenditure.  Perhaps World War II is the exception, when durables spending fell relative to
other consumption spending, but even then the exclusion of durables purchases from the
consumption series results only in a slight upward revision of the MRS series during the war
years.Century of Distortions - 12
The statistical sources of (i)-(iii) are clear from Figure 1 and the formulas (3) - (5).  The
Great Depression, WWII, and 1980’s changes in MRS derive in large part from the fluctuations
in labor input.  The consumption series mitigate, but do not erase, (i) and (ii) because
consumption grows somewhat more than output during the Great Depression and less than
output during WWII.  The consumption series contributes to the 1980’s increase in the
MRS because consumption is growing more than output while labor input is increasing.
Comparing the MPL series with the MRS series, we see that the log and log-Stone-Geary
MRS trend upward somewhat more slowly than the MPL.  Not surprisingly, the Stone-Geary
MRS grows more than the log MRS early in the century, and they are practically parallel later.
Since the MPL grows steadily throughout the century, the MRS fluctuations (i) - (iii) are each
relative to the MPL.
IV.C.  Implied Marginal Tax Rates
If the labor equilibrium equation is to explain these different trends and fluctuations in
MPL and MRS, it is with trending and fluctuating marginal tax rates.  Hence the next step in my
analysis is to compute the marginal tax rates implied by the labor equilibrium equation (1) and
Figure 2.  Figure 3 displays those implied tax rates for the log-Stone-Geary (solid line) and
Hansen (dash-dot line) MRS functions.  They fluctuate a lot from year-to-year because the MRS
fluctuates relative to the MPL.  They are much higher later in the century, partly because the
MRS grows more slowly (which in turn derives from the drop in labor hours from early in the
century) and partly because the consumption-output ratio has fallen.Century of Distortions - 13
Figure 3 Figure 3 Figure 3 Figure 3  Marginal ￿Tax￿ Rates Implied by Labor Equilibrium,
and Measured by Barro-Sahasakul
The implied tax rates are high during the Depression, and relatively low during the 1980’s.
Implied wartime tax rates are relatively low according to the log-Stone-Geary preferences ￿
because leisure time declines so much relative to the MPL ￿ and are relatively high according to
the Hansen preferences because those preferences imply that the MRS is independent of the
amount of leisure time, varying only with consumption.   These various differences over time
are very large ￿ implied rates rise 25-50 percentage points 1929-34, change by 8-20 percentage
points 1934-43 (falling 20 percentage points according to log-Stone-Geary, rising 8 points
according to Hansen), and fall 10-20 percentage points 1979-96.Century of Distortions - 14
12If MPL grows less than measured because labor input grows more than measured,
then measured growth of both MPL and MRS are wrong.  This is yet another reason why
implied tax rates might have growth less (or fell more) than measured ￿ not only is MPL
growth overstated, but MRS growth is understated because leisure growth is overstated.
IV.D.  Measured Wages and Hours Since 1970
Notice from Figure 2 that measured MPL rises since 1970, although at a slower rate than
prior to 1970.  This is true whether I measure MPL as labor compensation per manhour or as a
proportion of the average product of labor.  It has been pointed out (eg., Abraham, Spletzer, and
Stewart 1999) that other aggregate measures of wage do not rise since 1970.  Although a bit of the
difference among series can be attributed to the inclusion of fringe benefits in my measures,
which in theory ought to be included when measuring the MPL, many of the differences have
not been explained.  If in fact MPL grows less than I measure it, but the growth of MRS is
measured correctly, then I overestimate the increase (or understate the decrease) in the implied
tax rate since 1970.
12  I suggest below that it is puzzling that implied tax rates fall so much in the
1980’s, and recognize these measurement problems only exacerbates the puzzle.
V.  Potential Causes of Labor-Leisure Distortions V.  Potential Causes of Labor-Leisure Distortions V.  Potential Causes of Labor-Leisure Distortions V.  Potential Causes of Labor-Leisure Distortions
If the labor equilibrium equation (1) and the functional forms (2) - (5) are useful for
explaining labor market trends and fluctuations, then ideally measured marginal tax rates ￿ or
labor market distortions more generally ￿  should mimic the implied marginal tax rates in Figure
3.  Have labor market distortions risen, and by as much, as implied marginal tax rates over the
century?  Do marginal tax rates increase by 40 or 50 percentage points during the Depression?
Or fall 20 percentage points during the war?  Or fall 10-20 percentage points during the 1980’s?
In order to answer these questions, I calculate ￿marginal tax rates￿ for the century by examining
five potential sources of labor market distortions: federal labor income taxation, federal labor
market regulation, sales taxes, transfer payments, and monopoly unionism.  These marginal tax
rate series are then compared with the implied marginal tax rates shown in Figure 3.
V.A.  Federal Labor Income Taxes
Of course, taxes on labor income are expected to drive a wedge between MRS and MPL.Century of Distortions - 15
13For example, a federal return in the 15% bracket, with labor income below the Social
Security ceiling, filed in a year when the Social Security payroll tax rate was 7% on employee
and employer, would be assigned a marginal tax rate of 27.1% (.271 = (.15+.07+.07)/(1+.07))
which, according to Barro and Sahasakul￿s (1983, also 1986 equation 6) model of taxes, is the
wedge between MRS and MPL for the person filing that return.
Barro and Sahasakul use data on the ratio of personal income to AGI to make an
adjustment to their series for nonfilers prior to 1947 who are presumed to face a zero marginal
tax rate.
I use Barro and Sahasakul￿s (1986) series on marginal federal personal income and payroll tax
rates on labor income, as updated by Stephenson (1998) and Mulligan and Marion (2000).  To
a good approximation, this series uses disaggregated data on federal individual income tax returns
to compute, for each calendar year, cross-return averages of the statutory marginal tax rates.
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Figure 3 displays the Barro-Sahasakul ￿measured￿ series (dotted line), together the those
implied by labor equilibrium.  The measured series is zero prior to 1917, because there was no
federal personal income or payroll tax prior to that year.  There is barely any increase during the
Great Depression, and tremendous increases (from 7 to 26% 1940-44) and cuts (from 26 to 18%
1944-49) surrounding WWII.  Marginal rates increase fairly steadily after 1949, with minor
exceptions of the famous Kennedy and Reagan tax cuts.
The trend over from the 1890’s to the 1970’s is reasonably well explained by the labor
equilibrium equation (1).  Implied marginal tax rates grew from roughly 0 to 30% while the
federal marginal tax rates grew from 0 to 25 or 30%.  In other words, federal labor income taxes
and the labor equilibrium equation can explain a majority of the difference in the long term
trends of MRS and MPL.
Short and medium term fluctuations of the implied rates are poorly explained by the
Barro-Sahasakul series.  First, federal tax rates cannot explain why there were so many labor
hours prior to 1930 (ie, why the workweek has been shortened) and hence why MRS is so high
during that period.  The shorter workweek has been explained as a wealth effect, which is partly
captured by the Stone-Geary functional form (5) since consumption has risen more in real terms
than has leisure time.  There is substantial agreement in the literature that work hours per capita
have declined (although see Schor￿s 1991 and Leete and Schor￿s 1994 dissenting view, and
Stafford￿s 1992 and Juster and Stafford￿s 1992 reply), and that the decline is an income effect of
some kind (eg., Hunt and Katz 1998, Owen 1979).  The shorter workweek is also explained byCentury of Distortions - 16
the Hansen functional form (4), but for very different reasons ￿ consumption has risen less than
has the marginal product of labor schedule.
Second, implied rates increase by 25 to 50 percentage points, depending on the pre-
Depression benchmark year, during the Great Depression while there was hardly any increase
in marginal federal labor income tax rates.  Third, the implied rates derived from log and log-
Stone-Geary functions proceed to fall by 20 or 30 percentage points during WWII while
measured rates rise almost 20 percentage points.  Fourth, the implied rates rise after the war while
the measured rates fall.  These departures of implied from measured tax rates is one way of
numerically demonstrating the unexplained (by economists at least!) employment reduction
during the Depression and (according to Mulligan 1998) the unexplained employment and hours
increases during WWII.
According to the linear Hansen MRS function, the wartime MRS is low, and implied tax
rate high, when compared either to the 1930’s or the late 1940’s.  This is roughly consistent with
the labor equilibrium equation (1) since the Barro-Sahasakul measured tax rates increase and fall
during the 1940’s much like the implied tax rates.  However, the Barro-Sahasakul series increases
19 percentage points 1940-44 while the rates implied by Hansen preferences increase only 8
percentage points.  Also, notice how the post decline in Hansen-implied rates occurs prior to 1948,
while the postwar federal individual income tax cuts did not occur until 1948.
Fifth, both implied and measured tax rates fall in the 1980’s and 1990’s, but the implied
decline (10-20 percentage points) is much greater than the measured decline (2-5 percentage
points).  The 1980’s failure of the labor equilibrium equation (1) has not been examined in the
literature, but we see in Figure 2 how the divergence between MRS and MPL is 15 percentage
points or so, and hence of the same order of magnitude as the more well-known Depression and
War episodes.
Figure 3 displays a measured average marginal labor income tax rate that weights each
household (more accurately, each tax return) according to its adjusted gross income.  If the labor
equilibrium equation (1) is expected to hold at the individual level, then the average marginal tax
rate that makes (1) hold in the aggregate is not necessarily an income-weighted average of
household￿s tax rates.  But aggregatation bias in the implied tax rates is unlikely to be important
if tax rates, or at least changes in tax rates, do not vary substantially across households.  FigureCentury of Distortions - 17
14The income-weighted average marginal tax rates are from Barro and Sahasakul
(1986), as updated by Mulligan and Marion (2000).
15Census Bureau (1975, series Y-658) and Council of Economic Advisers (1996, Table
B-82).
4 provides some evidence on this point, by comparing measured marginal tax rates obtained by
weighted households equally (dashed series), and according to their income (solid series).
14  We
see how the return-weighted average is less than the AGI-weighted average, which derives from
the fact that statuatory income tax rates tend to rise with income.  But this has always been true,
so the two series are essentially parallel, at least prior to 1986.  After 1986, marginal rates were
actually lower at the highest income so that the AGI-weighted average fell below the return-
weighted average, a change which was reinforced by the growing inequality of incomes during
the 1980’s.  The AGI-weighted average increased after 1992, approaching the return-weighted
average, due to the Clinton Administration￿s lifting of the Hospital Insurance tax cap.  As a
result of these changes in the 1980’s, the return-weighted series explains a lot less of the 1980’s
reduction in implied rates than does the AGI-weighted series.
State and local income taxes are not included in Barro and Sahasakul￿s measures (or those
shown in Figure 4 below).  Like the federal personal income tax, marginal state and local income
tax rates vary across persons because the rates vary with the amount and composition of income
and with place of residence.  However, it seems that marginal state tax rates increase less with
income than do federal rates, so that average and marginal rates are closer for the former.  Since
the state and local income tax revenue is less than two percent of GDP for this entire period,
15
perhaps the average marginal state and local income is never much more than 2 percent and
therefore cannot explain more than a small fraction of the large changes shown in Figure 3.Century of Distortions - 18
Figure 4 Figure 4 Figure 4 Figure 4  Marginal Tax Rates Calculated from Federal Income Tax Data
V.B.  Sales Taxes and Consumption Regulations
Taxes on consumption expenditure also drive a wedge between MRS and MPL, with (in
the absence of other distortions, consumers equate their MRS to MPL/(1+F), where F is the
marginal sales tax rate.  However, given the assumed functional forms and the fact that my
measure of consumption is inclusive of sales taxes, we may not expect sales taxes to drive a







rates are equal, there is no measured wedge with the logarithmic or quasilinear function forms
(3) and (4):
Notice that the LHS of each equation is the measured MRS, because they include the sum of
consumption and sales tax revenue (c(1+F)).  I leave it to the reader to verify that the same
analysis applies when there are also labor income tax distortions.  On the basis of this result,
sales taxes appear in my analysis only as they are included in personal consumption
expenditures.
Consumption regulations can act like unmeasured sales taxes in the sense that they break
the link between wages, consumption expenditure, and leisure implied by the labor equilibrium
equation (1).  One way of modeling this would be to have a utility depend on labor input L and
a composite consumption good c that is a homogeneous function of the consumption of various
products, and those various products are imperfect substitutes in terms of their contribution to
the composite good.  Regulating a binding maximum on the amount consumed of some of the
products will, for a given wage, cause people to work less and spend less on consumption
expenditure ￿ just as would a sales tax.  When the MRS is measured as a stable function of labor
input and consumption expenditure, then the introduction of such a binding minimum drives
a wedge between wage and measured MRS.
Consumption regulations are particularly relevant during WWII when a number of
consumer goods were rationed to citizens (see Rockoff 1984 for one account).  Hence, while we
expect wartime income taxes to have reduced measured MRS relative to wages, we expect
measured MRS to have fallen even further as the result of rationing.  As mentioned above, we
observe just the opposite during WWII ￿ MRS grew more than MPL 1940-44 and grew less 1940-
48.Century of Distortions - 20
V.C.  Transfer Payments
Government transfer payments, such as those used by Social Security, welfare, and
unemployment systems are also expected to affect the gap between MRS and MPL.
Unfortunately (for the analyst), there are many transfer programs at the federal, state, and local
levels that might be expected to drive a wedge, and the incentive effects of even one of those
programs are complicated, heterogeneous, and changing over time.  Indeed, a entire paper ￿ or
literature ￿ might be devoted to the wedge created by one entitlement program in one year, for one
subset of the population (eg., Feldstein and Samwick 1992 on 1990 Social Security benefit
formulas and the working-aged population, Blinder, Gordon and Wise 1980 on 1977 Social
Security benefit formulas and the population aged 62-69, or Fraker, Moffitt, and Wolf 1985 on
1981 AFDC).  My approach is therefore to calculate an upper bound on the potential aggregate
incentive effects to see if transfer programs might credibly explain the large tax wedge changes
simulated from aggregate behavior.
Figure 5 displays as a solid red line government transfers (including those paid by federal,
state, and local governments) as a fraction of labor income for the years 1929-96.  Transfers have
increased over the long term, from practically zero to almost 20% of labor income.  Transfers
increased slightly  in nominal terms during the 1930’s while nominal labor income declined, so
Figure 5 shows an increase in the transfer-labor income ratio.  The transfer-labor income ratio
was relatively high between WWII and the Korean War.Century of Distortions - 21
Figure 5 Figure 5 Figure 5 Figure 5  Spending on Transfer Programs vs Simulated Tax Rates, 1929-96
While calculating the average marginal tax rate implicit in the portfolio of federal, state,
and local transfer programs is very difficult, the transfer-labor income ratio shown in Figure 5
is probably an upper bound on a more thorough and more accurate calculation of that rate.  To
see this, consider first a hypothetical example, and then a particular transfer programs.  As a
hypothetical example, suppose that we have N+M individuals, with the ith earning wi in the
absence of a transfer program.  When the program is in place, it pays wi only to those types i 0
[N+1,N+M] who choose not to work.  Obviously, the marginal tax rate is zero for i # N and 1 for
the others and, since the no work benefit is so generous, no i > N works.  The average marginal
rate, weighting each person i by his potential earnings, is:Century of Distortions - 22
16OMB (1998, Table 13.1).
17Of course, marginal rates from the tax side of the program are positive, but these are
counted in my federal labor income tax calculations.  Feldstein and Samwick (1992) suggest
that marginal rates from the benefit side of the program are negative for many of those less
than 62.
18For some of those aged 62+, the marginal tax rate is essentially zero (see Blinder,
Gordon and Wise 1980 for a similar analysis of earlier law), 33% for others, and 50% for still
others.  Using a different definition of ￿marginal￿, Diamond and Gruber calculate an average















upper bound on the weighted average marginal rate.
This claim is also consistent with evidence from the Social Security old age pension and
survivor program.  This program only pays benefits to those aged 62 and over (except widows
and widowers, who may be eligible as early as age 60) spent $289 billion in 1995, or 6.4% of labor
income.
16  Since the population aged 62 and over is 20% of the population aged 16+, the marginal
tax rate from the benefit formula is less than or equal to zero for those less than 62,
17 and the
average marginal tax rate from the benefit formula is well less than 50% for those aged 62+,
18 the
program￿s contribution to the economy-wide average marginal rate is well less than 10%, and
hence less (or at least not much more) than the program￿s economy-wide ￿average rate￿ of 6.4%.
Figure 5 displays as a dashed line the simulated tax rate minus the measured labor income
tax rate (shown as a solid line in Figure 4), which I interpret as that part of the simulated tax
wedge that is unexplained by income tax policy.  With its solid red line as an upper bound on
the composite marginal rate from transfer programs, Figure 5 suggests that transfer programs
may have contributed to the growing gap between MRS and MPL between 1929 and 1970,Century of Distortions - 23
19After the 1930’s, Figure 5 displays some positive high-frequency correlations between
transfer ￿tax rates￿ and unexplained simulated rates, which are consistent with the
hypothesis that transfer programs drive a wedge between MRS and MPL.  However, notice
that transfer programs tend to grow in size in response to nonemployment, so that
fluctuations in the MRS might cause fluctuations in measured transfer ￿tax rates￿ rather than
the other way around.
20ie, the mandated benefits exceed the amount workers would demand in the absence
of regulation.  See, for example, Summers (1989) for some analysis of this point.
although probably less than 20 percentage points.  The Figure suggests that, during the 1930’s,
simulated tax rates increased by an order of magnitude more than did the rates from transfer
programs, so that transfer programs cannot be an important part of an explanation of Depression
labor markets.
19  To put it quite simply, how could Depression transfer programs simultaneously
have large disincentive effects and not spend much money at a time when a lot of people were
not employed?
V.D.  Federal Labor Market Regulation
Labor market regulations are varied.  Some may have no effect because the regulations
require workers and employers to do things that they would already do, or because the
regulations are not enforced.  Others may lower the marginal product of labor schedule (or raise
it?), perhaps by restricting (or helping?) firms from using the most efficient production process.
But of particular interest for my study are regulations that drive a wedge between MRS and MPL.
In this regard, there are three categories of regulation of particular interest:
(a) regulations affecting the monopoly power of labor unions
(b) regulations fixing worker compensation, or requiring it to exceed some minimum
(c) regulations mandating the provision of various fringe benefits to workers
I defer my analysis of monopoly unionism until the next section.  According to the textbook
analysis, a binding minimum wage is one example of a regulation driving a wedge between MRS
and MPL because it puts some people out of work ￿ a movement down the aggregate labor supply
schedule ￿ and moves employers up their MPL schedule (aka, labor demand curve).  Mandatory
fringe benefits, if they affect the composition of worker consumption,
20 also affect the
relationship between labor costs, work hours, and consumption expenditure.  However,Century of Distortions - 24
21I make one addition to the list ￿ the 1933 National Recovery Act, which CSAB
presumably did not include on its list since it is no longer in affect at the time of their
writing.
22ie, the solid line in Figure 3 minus the dash-dot line in Figure 4.
Appendix II shows how the direction of the effect of mandatory fringe regulation depends on
whether the costs of the fringes are included in consumption expenditure, how consumption of
the fringe good affects the marginal rate of substitution between work and nonfringe goods, and
whether the mandatory minimum varies with earnings.  For example, regulating an increase in
the consumption of a good that lowers the disutility of work (such as work place safety?) could
increase MRS relative to MPL as calculated above.  Regulating an increase in the fraction of
earnings saved for retirement is a case in which regulation looks more like a labor income tax,
reducing MRS relative to MPL as calculated above.
Determining the direction of a particular regulation￿s effect on the wedge between MRS
and MPL is difficult, let alone accurately quantifying the wedge created by the large and varied
portfolio of federal regulation.  However, recall from Figure 3 that the changes in implied tax
rates to be explained are quite large ￿ on the order of 10 percentage points or more for the entire
labor force.  Hence, even a rough qualitative analysis of federal labor regulation can reveal
whether labor market regulation and its changes over time are a viable explanation.  It is such
a qualitative analysis that I present here.
Figure 6 displays as a dashed line the number of labor market regulations in effect in each
year since 1910, as listed and dated by the Center for the Study of American Business￿ 1981
Directory of Federal Regulatory Agencies.
21  For the reader￿s convenience, tax rates implied by log-
Stone-Geary utility, net of those ￿explained￿ by income taxes,
22 are graphed as a dotted line in
the Figure.  According to the dashed line, there is a growth in labor market regulation over the
century, and that may explain why the postwar implied marginal tax rates grew somewhat more
than the measured sales and marginal federal labor income tax rates.  There was a growth in
labor market regulation in the 1930’s that may have increased the wedge between MRS and MPL
but, at least according to the dashed line, even more growth in regulation was found in the 1960’s
and 1970’s when we did not see nearly such a divergence of MRS and MPL as in the 1930’s.Century of Distortions - 25
Figure 6 Figure 6 Figure 6 Figure 6  Labor Market Regulation 1910-1980
Of course, all regulations count equally in computing the dashed line, and there is no
adjustment for the fact that some regulations do not drive a wedge between MRS and MPL, but
rather decrease the MPL (or have no effect on either MRS or MPL).  Nor is there an adjustment
for the differential importance of various regulations (eg., the 1910 Mine Safety Act counts the
same as the Civil Rights Act), or for the differential impact over time of any single regulation
(eg., the minimum wage is presumably less important when the real minimum wage is low).Century of Distortions - 26
23For example, the 1931 Davis-Beacon Act applied only to construction employees
working on federally funded projects and the 1936 Walsh-Healy Act applied only to federal
government contractors, while the 1963 Equal Pay Act, Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
the 1967 Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the 1972 Equal Employment Opportunity
Act applied to a huge number of industries and employers.
24I include these regulation in the minimum compensation categories because, among
other things, they may require employers to hire minorities at terms undesirable to the
Figure 6￿s solid line reports an attempt to remedy one or two of these problems, by weighting
each act by estimates of the number of employees affected, as explained in Appendix I.  The
solid line suggests that labor regulation reached its modern order of magnitude with the 1933
National Industrial Recovery and 1935 Wagner Acts which, for the purpose of calculating the
solid line, we assume affects all nonagricultural nonsupervisory employees (compare this the
previous regulations which applied only to miners, federal employees, longshoremen, and
construction workers on federally funded projects).  Nevertheless, the solid line suggests that
labor regulation growth was as rapid, and probably more rapid, in the 1960’s and 70’s than in the
1930’s because, with the exception of the 1933 NIRA, 1935 Wagner Act, and 1938 Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA, affecting any medium-sized or large firm engaged in interstate commerce)
the 1930’s Acts only applied to specific industries while several 1960’s and 1970’s acts were much
more comprehensive.
23  Also notice that two of these Acts (1935 and 1938) came after the large
wedge appears between MRS and MPL (which was quite large by 1933).  It may be argued that,
while a number of 1960’s and 1970’s regulations covered a lot of employers, none was so important
as the 1933 National Recovery Act, the 1935 Wagner Act or 1938 FLSA.  The importance of the
Wagner Act is quantified in part below in the context of monopoly unions.
Figure 7 highlights two of the three labor regulation categories mentioned above ￿
mandatory fringe and minimum compensation.  Each of the series weight regulations according
to estimates of the number of workers affected.  The solid series includes all labor regulations
regardless of category, and is identical to the solid series in Figure 6.  The dashed (dotted) series
include only mandatory fringe (minimum compensation) regulation.  We see that both of those
two regulation categories experienced much more growth in the 1960’s and 1970’s because of a
growing number of broadly applicable regulations ￿ including the Civil Rights Act and other
discrimination regulation among the minimum compensation regulations
24 and OSHA andCentury of Distortions - 27
employer.
25The main reason few workers are thought to be effected, especially in the early years,
is that few industries were covered.
ERISA among the mandatory fringe regulations ￿ than in previous decades.  Also notice how,
although included in the ￿minimum compensation￿ category and passed in 1938, the FLSA does
not have much of an effect on the series shown because the Department of Labor Estimates that
few workers are affected.
25  Century of Distortions - 28
Figure 7 Figure 7 Figure 7 Figure 7  Two Categories of Labor Market Regulation 1910-1980
V.E.  Monopoly Unionism
Textbook monopoly unions, by definition, deliberately drive a wedge between MRS andCentury of Distortions - 29
26Other plausible union models have unions raising the payments from employers to
employees, but not in a way that distorts the labor-leisure margin (eg., Leontief 1946, and
applications by  Barro 1977 and MaCurdy and Pencavel 1986).  If the latter union model is
correct, then we immediately conclude that unions are not contributing to the wedge
between MRS and MPL.  However, all of these models imply that unions create a gap
between MPL and the measured wage, and therefore between MRS and the measured wage. 
See Appendix IV for more details.
MPL in order to raise member incomes.
26  The size of this wedge is related to the ￿relative union
wage gap￿, the percentage gap between a typical union worker and an observably otherwise
similar nonunion worker, often measured in the labor economics literature.  My approach is to
use the estimates from that literature to quantify the potential contribution of monopoly
unionism to the gap between MRS and MPL as measured in the aggregate.
Lewis (1963, 1986) surveys much of a large literature attempting to estimate the union
wage gap for various industries.  He stresses (1986, pp. 9, 187) that wage gaps vary a lot from
industry to industry, and are typically overestimated because union workers are expected to have
more unmeasured human capital than nonunion workers (so that measured wage gaps are only
part monopoly union power, and part human capital differences).  With these caveats in mind,
I construct Table 1 below by reproducing and extending Lewis￿ (1963) Table 50, reporting by time
period the relative wage gap for the ￿typical￿ unionized worker.Century of Distortions - 30
27The wedge is one minus the ratio of union sector MPL to union sector MRS which,
under these assumptions, is the same as one minus the ratio of union sector wage to union
sector MRS, which equals one minus the ratio of union sector wage to nonunion sector MRS,
which is the same as one minus the ratio of union sector wage to nonunion sector wage.
Table 1: Union Relative Wage Gaps by Time Period
parameter values








Table lists the difference between the typical union wage and the nonunion wage of
observationally similar workers, as a fraction of the nonunion wage.
Source: Lewis (1963, Table 50 and 1986, p. 9)
Notice in particular that the union wage gap is about twice as large during the Great Depression
(see also Lewis 1963, pp. 4f).
The measured wage gap need not be exactly the percentage wedge between MRS and
MPL in the union sector.  But it is perhaps a reasonable first estimate of that wedge ￿ and would
be identical to the wedge in the case that the wedge is zero in the nonunion sector, and the value
of time (MRS) is the same in both sectors.
27  With this, and Lewis￿ (1986, p. 9) overestimation
caveat, in mind I use the ￿lower￿ wage gaps reported in Table 1 as estimates of the  MRS/MPL
wedges in the union sector.
My calculations of implied tax wedges are for the entire economy, and not just the union
sector.  How much can monopoly unionism affect the average tax wedge?  Assuming theCentury of Distortions - 31
28Public sector union members are included.  Their contribution to the national union
density is small (5% in 1960; Rees 1989, p. 181), but growing steady over the period (Freeman
1986; Rees 1989 p. 181 says that 29% of union members in 1983 were public sector employees). 
Since 1983, the fraction of union members working in the public sector has grown further, to
44% by 2001 (BLS 2002).
29I use Census Bureau (1975, series D-17, 1900 value) to fill in Rees￿ missing
nonagricultural employment for the year 1897, and then Census Bureau (1975) series D-167,
170 and BLS series LFU40000000, LFU11102000000 to convert Rees￿ ratio to nonagricultural
employment to a ratio to the entire labor force.
monopoly union wedge is zero for nonunion workers, the size of the monopoly union wedge for
the average worker is the product of the union wedge and union density (ie, the fraction of the
labor force that is unionized
28).  Using Rees￿ (1989 Table 1)
29 time series, we see from the dashed
line in Figure 8 that union density increased somewhat during the 1930’s ￿ reaching 18% ￿ while
the largest increases during the century were after the Depression.  Union density has declined
since the 1950’s (see also Freeman and Medoff 1984, Figure 15-1), and perhaps that decline
accelerated in the late 1970’s and 1980’s.Century of Distortions - 32
Figure 8 Figure 8 Figure 8 Figure 8  Union Density and Induced Wedges 1897-1983
The solid line in Figure 8 illustrates how changes in union density might affect the time
series for the economy￿s average monopoly union wedge.  The solid line assumes a nonunion
sector wedge of 0, a union sector wedge of 15% prior to 1923, a union sector wedge equal to the
￿lower￿ gap estimates reported in Table 1 for the years 1923-79, and a union sector wedge of 0.10
after 1979.  The solid line suggests that monopoly unionism should have created a wedge of 2
percentage points by 1920, which is not readily seen in the implied wedge series graphed in Figure
3.  Union membership growth during the Depression, and especially the assumed growth in the
union sector wedge, added another 2 percentage points to the economy average wedge in the
1930’s, and might thereby explain a small part of the Depression￿s implied tax wedge shown inCentury of Distortions - 33
30BEA NIPA Table 701, line 4.
Figure 3.  However, even though it is assumed that the union sector wedge declines dramatically
after the Depression, the post-Depression growth in union membership implies that (with the
exception of the war) the economy-average wedge is pretty stable until the 1980’s.  The 1980’s
decline in union membership reduces the wedge by 1 or 2 percentage points, and can thereby
explain some but not all of the 1980’s reduction in the implied tax wedge.  Finally, since 1930,
monopoly unionism may have added a percentage point to the tax wedge.
Lewis (1986) survey only studies data up to 1979 and I assume, as do many in the the
￿wage structure￿ literature (eg., Bound and Johnson 1992, DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux 1996),
that Lewis￿ estimated union wage gap applies as to 1989 as well as 1979 even while union
membership declined in the 1980’s.  If unions wage gaps also declined in the 1980’s, then unions￿
contribution to the wedge declined more than shown by the solid lines.  For example, if union
wage gaps were largely eliminated during the 1980’s, then there would be essentially no union
wedge by the end of the 1980’s and we can calculate from Figure 8 that the 1980’s reduction in
monopoly unionism would explain a 3.6 percentage point reduction in the implied tax wedge.
3.6 percentage points from the decline of monopoly unions is similar in magnitude to the effects
of 1980’s income and sales tax cuts (5 percentage points), but together these two sources of
distortions still explain less than half of the 20 percentage point reduction in 1980’s implied tax
rates.
V.F.  Rigid Money Wages in the 1930’s
Between 1929 and 1933, the GDP deflator fell 30% 1929-33, and the CPI 28%.
30  One
interesting hypothesis is that wages do not ￿adjust￿ as well when prices are falling.  Perhaps this
is especially applicable to the 1930’s (although labor compensation per manhour also fell 30% from
1929-33)?  If so, one might expect ￿ as in the analysis of Barro and Grossman (1971) ￿ that rigid
money wages would drive a wedge between the MRS and MPL.
However, the timing and magnitude of such rigidities are difficult to measure
independently of the average product and consumption series shown in Figure 2.  This sets the
￿rigid wage￿ hypothesis apart from the public finance distortions (whose magnitude and timingCentury of Distortions - 34
were independently measured using IRS tax rules and return data) and the monopoly union
distortions (whose magnitude and timing were independently measured using union density and
Lewis￿s comparisons of union and nonunion sectors).  Are there direct measures of wage rigidity
for the 1930’s?  Or are there ￿flexible wage￿ sectors that could be compared with ￿rigid wage￿
sectors?
According to one special case of the ￿rigid wage￿ hypothesis (and one suggested by Lewis,
eg., 1963 pp. 5f), wages are rigid only in the union sector, in which case wage rigidity can be
measured independently of average productivity by comparing wages in union and nonunion
sectors.  This is what Lewis does, and his results are transformed into a wedge between MRS and
MPL in the previous section.  In other words, rigid wages may only be another interpretation of
the calculations I interpreted above as ￿monopoly union.￿
V.G.  Employment Search Frictions
The above discussion views unemployment as leisure ￿ either intentional (as in the
textbook model of labor supply) or unintentional (as in rigid wage models like Barro-Grossman).
According to a third view, embodied in search models like those of Mortensen (1982), Hosios
(1990), Pissarides (2000), and others, unemployment indicates frictions in the process of
matching workers to jobs, and those frictions do not result from taxes or rigid wages by
themselves.  Quite literally, ￿technology￿ ￿ the matching technology ￿ is a determinant of
unemployment in those models.  If we view unemployment as itself a ￿shock￿ to the economic
system, rather than a choice made by labor suppliers in response to productivity shocks, taxes,
etc., how much of the gap between MRS and MPL remains unexplained?
In order to answer this question and begin to understand some implications of my
calculations for search models, let the year t unemployment rate ut be a technological parameter
representing the fraction of leisure foregone that cannot be employed in the production process.
The utility function in such a model is thereby a function  , with unemployment u ct,1&
Lt
1&ut
having the effect of increasing the marginal disutility of work because u additional units ofCentury of Distortions - 35
31Here we assume that the unemployed have the same disutility of work as those
working, as compared to the assumption above (and in textbook labor supply models) that
the unemployed have the same disutility of work as those out of the labor force.
MRSt ' (1 & Jt)(1& ut)MPLt (1) (1) (1) (1)N N N N
unexplained distortion ' 1 &
MRSt
(1 & Jt)(1& ut)MPLt
leisure must be foregone in order to supply (1-u) units of labor to the production process.
31
Following the notation above, MRS is the marginal rate of substitution in the function u, and the
labor ￿equilibrium￿ equation becomes:
In other words, unemployment in search models can add to the wedge between marginal
product and marginal rate of substitution, and that wedge is determined at least in part by the
matching technology rather than tax policies or the technology of production.  With functional
forms for the production and utility functions, and a time series for the unemployment rate, we
can calculate the labor market distortion that is neither ￿explained￿ by measured marginal tax
rates or by measured unemployment rates.  The formula for the unexplained distortion is:
where MRS depends on consumption and time out of the labor force.  The solid series in Figure
9, measured on the left scale, displays the unexplained distortion assuming Cobb-Douglas
production and log-Stone-Geary.  As a reference, the dashed series is from Figure 5, and also
measured on the left scale.Century of Distortions - 36
32The unemployed rate affects the solid line in two ways.  The first is its appearance in
the denominator of the unexplained distortion formula above.  The other is its effect on the
MRS function when it is calculated using leisure hours that exclude the time of the
unemployed, rather than including it as the previous calculations.  Figure 9’s dotted line
shows this second effect because it is calculated by subtracting (in logs) the log-Stone-Geary
MRS series from Figure 2 from the series revised using the unemployment series.  We see
Figure 9 Figure 9 Figure 9 Figure 9  Unemployment as a Measured Distortion
Comparing the solid and dashed series, we see how the unexplained distortion is the same in the
1930’s as in most of the postwar period, so the most of the aggregate MRS-MPL gap between the
1930’s and 1950-70 is associated taxes or with the unemployment rate.
32  The story is differentCentury of Distortions - 37
that most of the effect of treating unemployment as a labor market distortion derives from
it￿s effect on the calculated MRS adding, for example, about 0.8 percentage points more to the
MRS in the 1930’s than it does to the postwar years.
looking backwards from the 1930’s as, say, the 1920’s has significantly less labor market distortions
that are not explained by taxes or unemployed.  The two series also show how calculations of the
unexplained distortion are, outside the 1930’s, insensitive to the treatment of unemployment.
Figure 9 shows how unexplained distortions are essentially the same in the 1930’s as in
most of the postwar years, so that aggregate work hours have a stable relationship with a
relatively few aggregate variables (namely, consumption, unemployment, and after-tax wages)
during that period.  This finding gives us some guidance as to modeling aggregate behavior, but
I would be greatly exaggerating to say that consumption and work hours fluctuations were fully
explained.  First of all, while the textbook model is perhaps too extreme to view the time of the
unemployed to be entirely leisure time, the calculations behind Figure 9￿s solid line are at the
other extreme, with none of the time of the unemployed substitutable with leisure.  Second, I
have not offered an explanation if why the unemployment rate fluctuates from year to year.  It
may even be the case that the kinds of regulatory and tax policies discussed above are the reason
why unemployment is as high as observed, and why it fluctuates over time.  Nonetheless, my
calculations show that whatever model ends up fitting these data will produce the same kinds of
aggregate relationships between consumption, work hours, after-tax wages, and unemployment
rates as does the simple and familiar aggregate Cobb-Douglas model.
VI.  Summary and Conclusions VI.  Summary and Conclusions VI.  Summary and Conclusions VI.  Summary and Conclusions
Using quantity data and functional forms from the literature, I calculate time series for
the marginal value of time (MRS) and marginal product of labor (MPL).  According to the labor
equilibrium equation, MRS = (1-J)MPL, where J is a wedge driven between MRS and MPL by
tax policy, regulatory policy, monopoly unionism, and other labor market distortions.  I use the
MRS and MPL series to calculate the marginal tax rates implied by the labor equilibrium
equation (namely, the implied rate is 1 - MRS/MPL), and compare them with tax-equivalentCentury of Distortions - 38
33E.g., stable relationships are seen in among a few aggregate measures of monetary
behavior (eg., Friedman and Schwartz 1982), and measures of credit market behavior
(Mulligan 2001b).
measures of marginal tax rates, regulatory policy, the monopoly power of unions, and
unemployment.
My calculations are designed to inform those who construct theories of the labor market.
In particular, the calculations show when and how there is a stable relationship, of the kinds
predicted by many applications of the ￿labor equilibrium equation,￿ between aggregate
consumption, aggregate work hours, wages, and various measures of labor market distortions.
Such aggregate relationships are of substantial interest because they are implied by a large
number of aggregate and microeconomic models of the labor market, and are verified empirically
in other applications of aggregative economic theory.
33  Some conclusions that can be made from
my calculations are summarized below by historical time period. 
VI.A.  Work Hours Prior to 1929
Labor input is high prior to 1929 ￿ even higher than one would expect in the absence of
labor income taxes.  This shows up in my calculations as a negative implied tax rate derived from
the log utility function.  Stone-Geary preferences can partly ￿explain￿ high labor input during
this period as an income effect, as has been suggested in the literature.  But even with the Stone-
Geary preferences, implied rates are often negative prior to 1929, so the labor equilibrium
equation is not fully successful at explaining the reduction in hours from the beginning of the
century.
VI.B.  Trends 1929-80
Implied rates have increased from roughly 0 in 1929 to 40% in 1980.  Marginal federal labor
income tax rates have increased almost this much, labor regulation has probably contributed to
the tax wedge, and union density has increased, so the labor equilibrium equation explains the
1929-80 secular trend pretty well.  Explaining the direction and magnitude of this trend is
probably the most remarkable achievement of the rather simple aggregate application of equation
(1).Century of Distortions - 39
34The 1929-96 0.107 log point growth in leisure time corresponds to a 0.092 log point
reduction in labor hours, which in turn can be decomposed into 0.104 and -0.196 log point
increases in ￿employment￿ and ￿hours per employee,￿ respectively.
Table 2 displays the accounting in some more detail, assuming the MRS function (3).  The
left panel simulates the change in the implied marginal tax rate, ) J ^, which is approximately the
difference between ) ln MPL + ) ln (1-L) and the growth of consumption.  The implied tax rate
increases over this period because, in effect, ￿expenditure￿ on leisure time (ie, (1-L)MPL) has
grown more rapidly than expenditure on consumption,
34 and the difference is about 37 percentage
points over the 1929-96 period.




(1) ) ln MPL 1.328 1.499 (4) ) federal PIT 0.327 0.286
(2) ) ln (1-L) 0.194 0.107 (5) ) state PIT 0.014 0.017
(3) ) ln c 0.870 1.232 (6) ) unions 0.011 ?
(1)+(2)-(3) . . . .) ) ) )     J J J J ^ ^ ^ ^0 . 5 6 9 0.569 0.569 0.569 0.374 0.374 0.374 0.374 (7) ) transfers ? ?
(8) ) regulation ? ?
(4)+(5)+(6)+(7)+(8) ) ) ) )     J J J J 0.352+? 0.352+? 0.352+? 0.352+? 0.303+? 0.303+? 0.303+? 0.303+?
Notes: ) denotes changes over time; ￿PIT￿ = personal income tax
Table 2’s right panel reports estimates of ￿restraints of trade￿ in the labor market,
reported as tax rate equivalents.  Item (4) is Barro and Sahasakul￿s average federal marginal tax
rate from the Personal Income and Social Security taxes.  Item (5) is an estimate of average
marginal state personal income tax rates and sales (both federal and state) tax rates.  Items (6)-
(8) provide for tax rate equivalent measures of wedges created by unions, transfer payments and
regulation.  As discussed in the text, numerical estimates of (6)-(8) are presumably positive (and
small in the case of unions), but are difficult to calculate more precisely.  Hence the last row ofCentury of Distortions - 40
35The major labor regulations occurred late enough that they probably do not explain
the wedge prior to 1935.
the Table reports that the measured tax rate J grows by at least 30 percentage points over the
1929-96 period.  Since behavior, together with log utility and the labor equilibrium equation,
suggests that restraints of trade have grown by 37 percentage points 1929-96, log utility and the
labor equilibrium equation do quite a good job of explaining behavior during the period.
If we use the Stone-Geary utility function, which better fits the pre-1929 data, then the
accounting is the same as in Table 2, except that ) ln c is replaced by ) ln (c-().  For ( = 1000
1996 dollars per adult, ) ln (c-() is 0.957 and 1.338 for 1929-80 and 1929-96, respectively.
Expenditure on nonsubsistence consumption also grows less than ￿expenditure￿ on leisure time,
so tax rates implied by Stone-Geary utility also increase over time.  Subtracting the former from
the latter, we have that ) J ^ is approximately 0.489 and 0.251, respectively.
VI.C.  The Great Depression
Implied tax rates rise dramatically in the early 1930’s and persist for the decade.  None of
this increase can be attributed to federal labor income taxes, because only a small minority of the
1930’s population was liable for such taxes.  Sales, custom, and excise taxes increased during the
1930’s, but the revenue involved is much too small for these tax increases to add more than a a
percentage point or so to the wedge between MRS and MPL.
Labor regulation and the effects of monopoly unionism probably did grow in the 1930’s
and in this sense explain some, but only a small minority, of the Depression wedge.
35  However,
these explanations imply that the wedge would grow (beyond any growth due to income
taxation) after the 1930’s whenever labor regulation or the effects of monopoly unionism grew.
Instead, Figure 3 shows how implied tax rates grew together with, rather than in excess of,
marginal federal labor income tax rates, even during the period 1940-55 when union density
almost doubled and during the period 1960-80 when labor regulation grew at least as much as it
did in the 1930’s.
Measuring the effects of regulation and unionism is a tricky business, and future research
c a n  u n d o u b t e d l y  i m p r o v e  o n  m y  e f f o r t s .   R e g a r d l e s s  o f  w h a t  t h a t  r e s e a r c h  s h o w s ,  o n e
contribution of my analysis is to reformulate the old question ￿Why was employment lowCentury of Distortions - 41
during the Depression?￿ as ￿What drove a 40% wedge between marginal product and value of
time?￿.  As Mulligan (2000) argues, this reformulation can direct those searching for
explanations away from those that do not create significant tax wedges (eg., productivity shocks,
shocks to international trade) towards those that might.
If we view unemployment as a shock to the system, rather than as a response to
productivity or policy shocks, then we see much less of a (peacetime) departure between
MRS and MPL since 1930 that cannot be explained by income taxes.  Hence, while my
calculations suggest that labor productivity shocks cannot explain much of the 1930’s labor
market behavior, shocks to the productivity of job search might.  Of course, the question
remains as to the source of those shocks and, given the unemployment measures, what is the
source of the remaining 1930’s divergence of MRS and MPL.
VI.D.  WWII
Federal tax rates grow from practically zero to more than 20% during WWII, and this
should have caused MRS to grow much less than MPL during that period.  Consumption
rationing should have added to the measured wartime wedge.  Instead, the log-Stone-Geary
functional form suggests that MRS grew much more, and the Hansen functional form suggests
that MRS grew only slightly less.  In other words, WWII leisure time is lower (or consumption
higher) than implied by the labor equilibrium equation.  Also, both functional forms imply
substantial changes in MRS relative to MPL between 1944 and 1947, while measured tax rates did
not really change until 1948.
VI.E.  Leisure and Consumption Since 1980
Perhaps my more novel finding is that the value of time grew much more than the
marginal product of labor during the 1980’s, to such an extent that implied ￿tax￿ wedges were
reduced by 20 percentage points.  The Reagan administration claimed to have policies reducing
the wedge between MPL and MRS ￿ such as reducing marginal federal personal income tax rates,
taking a tough stance against unions, and resisting nominal minimum wage increases ￿ so
perhaps wedge reductions were to be expected.  Wedge reductions during the Reagan
administration are some evidence of empirical success of the labor equilibrium equation,Century of Distortions - 42
especially since that equation successfully predicts wedge increases prior to 1980, although it
appears that the 20 percentage point reduction is more than one would expect based on tax
records and observations of union behavior.  Average marginal federal labor income tax rates
were reduced by five percentage points, or less.  My calculations suggest that the decline of
monopoly unionism contributed to reduced wedges, but no more than 3 percentage points, so
much of the 1980’s behavioral changes remain unexplained.
VI.F.  What About Unobserved Preference Shifts?
Shifts in the MRS function have also received some attention in some disaggregated time
series studies of female labor supply, retirement, and the changing composition of labor input
between employment and hours.  These shifts are real, but the relevant questions here are (a)
whether these shifts show up in the aggregate, given that some of them are in opposite
directions, and (b) whether they are relevant for the decade-to-decade changes emphasized here.
It is doubtful that the Depression or the changes in the 1980’s were caused by the same forces
responsible for a century of increase female labor force participation, a century of decreasing
labor force participation among older men.
My approach is to assume that the equilibrium condition MRS = (1-J)MPL is indeed
testable, an assumption consistent with so many models in the literature that have MRS as a
stable function of a few aggregate observables.  My assumption fails, of course, in models like
those of Parkin (1988) or Hall (1997) where there are enough unobserved determinants of
preferences.  Without direct measures of the causes of market distortions, or of the taste
parameters, it is impossible to determine whether a deviation between measured MRS and MPL
is due to a distortion or a preference shift.  But we do have measures of taxation and other
indicators of distortionary public policy, and I believe that many of the ￿taste shifts￿ indicated
by Hall are in fact changes in distortions.  For example, Hall (1997, Figure 8) shows a ￿shift in
preferences￿ away from leisure during the 1980’s.  But the 1980’s were a time when federal
government was cutting marginal tax rates, and private sector unions were on a dramatic decline,
so my Section V interprets a large part of the 1980’s changes as reductions in labor-leisure
distortions.
I do not want to suggest that all gaps between measured MRS and MPL are distortionsCentury of Distortions - 43
rather than preference shifts.   Indeed, the results above suggest that some apparently large gaps
between MRS and MPL are not readily explained by measures of restraints of trade.  As I have
argued elsewhere (Mulligan 1998), World War II may be the strongest case for the tastes
interpretation.  Figure 3 shows how, during the war, people acted as if either: (a) there was a
labor-leisure taste shift, or (b) there were markedly smaller distortions than in the 1930’s or 1950’s.
I see no indication that taxes, unionism, and other potential causes of distortions were reduced
enough in the 1940’s, and at least casual empiricism suggests that patriotism and other taste
changes were significant.
Figure 3 also shows how people acted in the 1930’s as if there were either huge labor
market distortions or a big shift in tastes.  I and many others are tempted to search for and model
causes of labor market distortions, but at this point I must admit that the available measures do
not indicate that taxes, unionism, or regulation were unusual enough during the 1930’s to serve
as significant and plausible explanations of 1930’s behavior.  Whether the Depression labor
market will ultimately be explained by tastes or market distortions is still an open question.
VII.  Appendix I: Quantifying Labor Regulation VII.  Appendix I: Quantifying Labor Regulation VII.  Appendix I: Quantifying Labor Regulation VII.  Appendix I: Quantifying Labor Regulation
I proceed in three steps in order to quantify 20
th Century labor market regulation.  First,
I obtain a list of labor regulations and their dates of enactment from The Center for the Study
of American Business￿ 1981 Directory of Federal Regulatory Agencies.  To that list I add the 1933
National Industrial Recovery Act, which is no longer in affect today but was potentially
important at the time of its enactment.  The list is shown in Tables A-1 and A-2 below, and is
the basis of the series in Figures 6 and 7:Century of Distortions - 44
Table A-1: Labor Regulations 1910-60
Year Act Industries/Workers Affected
1910 Mine Safety metal and nonmetal mines
1916 Federal Employees Compensation Federal and Postal employees
1927 Longshoremen’s and Harbor Worker’s
Compensation
Maritime workers, employees of
government contractors overseas
1931 Davis-Bacon Construction employees working on
federally funded projects (est. as
construction employment*federal
employment/total employment)
1933 National Industrial Recovery National Industrial Recovery National Industrial Recovery National Industrial Recovery (through 1935) same as NLR (below)
1935 National Labor Relations (Wagner Act) National Labor Relations (Wagner Act) National Labor Relations (Wagner Act) National Labor Relations (Wagner Act) All employers involved in interstate
commerce, except air, rail, agriculture,
and gov’t (employees est. as private
nonsupervisory workers)
1936 Public Contracts (Walsh-Healy Act) Federal government contractors
1938 Fair Labor Standards Employees of firms involved in
interstate commerce which meet
volume amounts.  (employees affected
est. as Dept of Labor report of workers
affected by federal minimum wage)
1947 Labor-Management Relations (Taft Hartley) Labor-Management Relations (Taft Hartley) Labor-Management Relations (Taft Hartley) Labor-Management Relations (Taft Hartley) Same as Wagner Act
1959 Labor-Management Reporting and Discolsure Labor-Management Reporting and Discolsure Labor-Management Reporting and Discolsure Labor-Management Reporting and Discolsure Same as Wagner Act
Notes: (1) Source is CSAB (1981, pp. 103-5), plus 1933 NRA
(2) boldface type denotes union protective legislation boldface type denotes union protective legislation boldface type denotes union protective legislation boldface type denotes union protective legislation
(3) italics type denotes ￿mandatory fringe￿ legislation, such as mandatory minimum safety
conditions, mandatory health or disability insurance, etc.
(4) underline type denotes mandatory minimum compensation legislationCentury of Distortions - 45
Table A-2: Labor Regulations 1960-80
Year Act Industries/Workers Affected
1963 Equal Pay Same as FLSA, times fraction of
employment that is female
1963 Farm Labor Contractor Registration agricultural workers
1964 Civil Rights (Title VII) Same as FLSA, times fraction of
employment that is non-white
1965 Executive Order 11246 Extension of Civil Rights and Equal
Pay Acts to Government contractors
1965 Service Contract Government contractors
1966 Federal Metal and Nonmetallic Mine Safety metal and nonmetal mines
1967 Age Discrimination in Employment Same as FLSA
1968 Consumer Credit Protection Same as FLSA
1969 Coal Mine Health & Safety (Black Lung) Coal mines
1969 Construction Safety Employees of privately funded
construction contracts
1970 Occupational Safety and Health All employees except state or federal
government employees
1971 Postal Reorganization Postal employees
1972 Equal Employment Opportunity Same as Civil Rights
1973 Rehabilitation Federal contractors
1974 Health Care Institutions Health Care Institutions Health Care Institutions Health Care Institutions nonsupervisory health industry
employees
1974 Employee Retirement Income Security Private sector employees with benefit
plans
1974 Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Federal contractors (affected
employees estimated as federal
contractor employees*Vietnam
veterans/total employment)
1977 Federal Mine Safety and Health Amendments Coal, metal, and nonmetal mines
1977 Black Lung Benefits Reform Coal miners
1978 Pregnancy Discrimination Same as Equal Pay
1978 Civil Service Reform Federal employees
Notes: (1) Source is CSAB (1981, pp. 103-5), plus 1933 NRA
(2) boldface type denotes union protective legislation boldface type denotes union protective legislation boldface type denotes union protective legislation boldface type denotes union protective legislation
(3) italics type denotes ￿mandatory fringe￿ legislation, such as mandatory minimum safety
conditions, mandatory health or disability insurance, etc.
(4) underline type denotes mandatory minimum compensation legislationCentury of Distortions - 46
The second step in the analysis is to make some determination of the types of workers affected
by each Act, which I have done based on CSAB￿s description of each Act and report in the last
column of the Tables.  The number of workers of each type is found from bls.gov, Council of
Economic Advisers (1996), and Census Bureau (1975), and used to construct the weighted series
shown in Figures 6 and 7.
Third, I make an attempt to separate those Acts that are more likely to drive a wedge
between MRS and MPL.  Regulations supposed to protect unions are an obvious candidate, and
are indicated in bold in the Tables.  Regulations that dictate part of an employee￿s compensation
package for employees can also be expected to drive a wedge to the extend that they distort that
package.  For example, an Act such as OSHA may require employers to provide safety at a cost
that exceeds the value of safety to workers and thereby drive a wedge between MRS and MPL.
Such ￿mandatory fringe￿ legislation is indicated in italics in the two Tables, and are the basis for
the dashed series shown in Figure 7.  ￿Mandatory minumum compensation￿ legislation mainly
dictates the rate of pay, or a minimum rate of pay, for workers; the relevant acts are underlined
in the Tables.
VIII.  Appendix II: Consumption Regulation and Measured Marginal Rates of Substitution VIII.  Appendix II: Consumption Regulation and Measured Marginal Rates of Substitution VIII.  Appendix II: Consumption Regulation and Measured Marginal Rates of Substitution VIII.  Appendix II: Consumption Regulation and Measured Marginal Rates of Substitution
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IX.  Appendix III: The Union Relative Wage Effect and Aggregate Distortions IX.  Appendix III: The Union Relative Wage Effect and Aggregate Distortions IX.  Appendix III: The Union Relative Wage Effect and Aggregate Distortions IX.  Appendix III: The Union Relative Wage Effect and Aggregate Distortions
Suppose that, at any date t, employment occurs in two sectors: the ￿union sector￿ (in
amount Lt
u) and the ￿nonunion sector￿ (in amount Lt - Lt
u).  In the nonunion sector, wages wt
equal marginal product.  Wages in the union sector are wt
u, and may (or may not) exceed the
marginal product in that sector.  One model of the union wage effect is in the spirit of Leontief
(1946), where union employment is set so that the marginal product of labor is wt, but union
employees are paid more than wt.  Here there is no labor-leisure distortion; in the Cobb-Douglas
case the aggregate consumption-leisure ratio would move together with the average product of
labor (which, in turn, is proportional to wt) regardless of the fraction of employment that occurs
in the union sector and of the amount by which union wages exceed marginal product.
However, measured wages exceed wt, so the measured wage time series would be different fromCentury of Distortions - 47
36Since measured labor￿s share of GDP is so constant since 1929, it seems that the rise
and fall of unions cannot be described according to Leontief￿s model, or that the gap between
average and marginal labor product has evolved in such a way as to cancel the labor share
effects of unions￿ rise and fall.
37As it would be in a household labor supply model where only some family members
can be employed in the union sector.
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both the consumption-leisure ratio and the average product of labor.
36
A second model is Dunlop￿s (1944), or the textbook monopoly model, where the union
wage equals marginal product in that sector, and the union wage effect occurs because union
employment is too low.  The MRS equals MPL only in the nonunion sector, and therefore is less
than the average wage w G t and the average marginal product.  If we equate the representative
household￿s MRS to the nonunion MPL,
37 then (in the absence of other distortions) the simulated
tax rate is just the product of union density (Lt
u/Lt) and the union relative wage effect
(wt
u-wt)/w G t:
This is the formula I use to construct Figure 8.  The same formula applies even if unions
are not distortionary as in Leontief￿s model, except that it is a formula for the measured distortion
based on measured wages.  The true distortion would be zero in Leontief￿s model, and so would
the measured distortion if MPL were measured rather than wages.  In other words, both models
predict that an increase in union density or an increase in the union relative wage effect will
increase the gap between MRS and measured wages.  Only the Dunlop model predicts that these
would increase the gap between MRS and MPL.
X.  Appendix IV: The Sensitivity of Implied Tax Rates to the Frisch Labor Supply Elasticity X.  Appendix IV: The Sensitivity of Implied Tax Rates to the Frisch Labor Supply Elasticity X.  Appendix IV: The Sensitivity of Implied Tax Rates to the Frisch Labor Supply Elasticity X.  Appendix IV: The Sensitivity of Implied Tax Rates to the Frisch Labor Supply Elasticity
Consider a MRS function of the form:Century of Distortions - 48
38Here 2 is adjusted with 0 to match the overall level of implied and measured tax





where 0 is a constant Frisch labor supply elasticity.  0 = 1 is the function (5) considered in the
main text, and the corresponding implied tax rates received the most attention in my analysis.
But how sensitive are the results to 0?  To answer this question, observe the Figure below
which graphs implied tax rates for 0 = 0.5, 0 = 2/3, 0 = 1.5, and 0 = 2.
38  For reference, the dotted
line is the Barro-Sahasakul (AGI-weighted) measured marginal tax rate.Century of Distortions - 49
Figure Figure Figure Figure Sensitivity of Implied Rates to Frisch Elasticity
We see that implied tax rates are quite sensitive to 0 ￿ so sensitive that some of the series need
to be truncated to make the graph readable.  But notice that, regardless of 0:
(d) implied rates rise substantially 1929-33
(e) implied rates fall 1940-44, or at least do not rise like measured rates
(f) implied rates rise 1940-48
(g) implied rates fall in the 1980’s
Hence the main conclusions in the text are robust to 0, except perhaps it could be argued with
a large 0 that measured and implied rates fall by the same magnitude in the 1980’s.  Moreover,
none of the 0￿s different from one can explain the postwar or century-long trends in measured
tax rates ￿ a result that is consistent with the accounting shown in Table 2.Century of Distortions - 50
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